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Abstract: This article explores Axel Honneth’s attempts to reconnect the 
struggles of workers with the normative content of modernity through 
Hegel’s intersubjective account of recognition. The importance of 
Honneth’s writings lies in his attempt to extend Habermas’ account of 
normative self-constitution to labor via the morally motivated struggles of 
workers to correct the modern maldistribution of social worth. To this 
extent, the expansion of ethical life is predicated on the struggles of 
excluded participants to gain inclusion within the normative content of 
modernity. From this perspective Habermas’ attempt to legitimate the 
exclusion of labor (by the system) from the normative content of 
modernity appears unjust and unjustified. Unfortunately, Honneth shares 
with Habermas a tendency to locate the economic system beyond the 
(culturally defined) limits of ethical life. He thereby fails to acknowledge 
the extent to which workers play a major role in re-moralizing the former 
via the de-reification of the latter. 
 
From his earliest writings Axel Honneth has sought to widen and deepen the 
normative ground of critical theory in order to extend the remit of 
intersubjectivity to labor. Honneth thus rejects Jürgen Habermas’ abandonment 
of labor to the non-normative system in favor of reformulating workers’ 
struggles in normative terms. Nevertheless, Honneth’s alternative to Habermas’ 
communicative paradigm is restricted to the latter’s culturally bound account of 
moral agency. Thus in his work on struggles for recognition Honneth largely 
concedes the diremption of morality from materiality to the detriment of the 
latter’s emancipatory potential. Honneth then compensates for the lack of 
substance that results from this bifurcated account of modernity by grounding 
his own version of undamaged intersubjectivity in an underlying philosophical 
anthropology. To this extent, Honneth, like Karl Marx and Habermas before 
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him, grounds critical theory, not in the struggles of participants to redeem the 
normative promise of modernity, but in a social ontology that the latter is tasked 
to realize. 
 At the same time, Honneth shares with Marx and Habermas a historically 
informed account of critical theory grounded in the modern ethos of autonomy. 
Hence Honneth’s declaration that: “Critical Theory in its innermost core—
whatever its congruence with other forms of social critique may be—is 
dependent on the quasi-sociological specification of an emancipatory interest in 
social reality itself” (Honneth 1994: 256). Unfortunately, Honneth fails to redeem 
this viewpoint consistently by grounding critical theory in the struggles of 
participants to overcome the heteronomy of the system. Instead, Honneth 
adopts the standpoint of an objective observer with the capacity to rule on what 
is and what is not pathological about modernity. Thus just as Marx grounds the 
human species in self-objectifying labor, and Habermas in language oriented to 
mutual understanding, so Honneth emphasizes the role played by social 
recognition in the successful development of identity. Armed with this objective 
definition of what comprises an undamaged form of intersubjectivity, Honneth 
criticizes modernity for failing to obtain this normative ideal. 
 It will not, however, be possible, in what follows, to do justice to the 
intricacies and complexities of Honneth’s account of recognition. Instead I shall 
limit myself to his account of workers’ struggles to re-moralize labor as this 
demonstrates that critical theory’s normative turn need not be at the expense of 
labor. Nevertheless, Honneth inherits from Habermas a tendency to generate a 
model of critical theory that is at one and the same time too strong and too 
weak—too strong in the sense that it transforms workers’ struggles for 
recognition into mere means for a supra-social teleology; too weak in the sense 
that it fails to criticize the system’s capacity to damage intersubjectivity. To this 
extent, Honneth’s version of critical theory is dependent on an objective 
standpoint that arises from the system’s capacity to reify intersubjectivity. Thus, it 
is not possible to reground critical theory within the struggles of participants to 
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realize the normative promise of modernity without challenging the system’s 
diremption of ethical life. 
The moral content of labor 
In an early essay entitled “Work and Instrumental Action: On the Normative 
Basis of Critical Theory”, Honneth argues that Habermas’ attempt to extend 
Marxism in the direction of intersubjective understanding “is paid for by the 
disappearance of the conflict potential still available in social labor from the 
theory of action” (Honneth 1995a: 40). In other words, by reducing labor to a 
purely technical relationship between humanity (subject) and nature (object), 
Habermas “dissolves the categorical connection which Marx attempts to 
establish between social labor and social liberation” (ibid.: 44). What is at issue 
here, argues Honneth, is not the instrumental status of labor but who is in charge 
of its application: 
A critical concept of work must grasp categorically the difference between an 
instrumental act in which the working subject structures and regulates his own activity 
on his own initiative, according to his own knowledge, in a self-contained process, and 
an instrumental act in which neither the accompanying controls nor the object-related 
structures of the activity is left to the initiative of the working subject. (Honneth 1995a, 
p. 46) 
Thus, it is not labor’s instrumental character that robs workers of their 
autonomy, but workers’ lack of control over the labor process. To this extent, 
argues Honneth, labor retains a normative dimension “based not upon the 
consciousness of systemically distorted relations of communication, but the 
experience of the destruction of true acts of work in the course of the 
rationalization of production techniques” (ibid.: 47). The moral damage that 
accompanies modernity is not, therefore, restricted to impaired communication, 
but extends to the systematic expropriation’ of workers’ own work activity. “The 
valid normative claim which thus comes to expression results from a moral 
vulnerability which grows not from the suppression of communicative modes of 
mutual understanding but from the expropriation of the workers’ own work 
	  	   107 
activity”1 (ibid.: 47). It follows that the more work is subject to external 
determination, the more this is attended by “an opposing action process on 
which working subjects cooperatively seek to reclaim control over their own 
activity. Thus, oddly enough, a moment of practical recollection would then seem 
to dwell within the unjustified domination of alienated labor” (ibid.: 48). Honneth 
then argues that it is possible to reconnect labor and normativity through a 
notion of what comprises “the conditions of an undistorted act of work” (ibid.: 
45). 
 Nevertheless, there are problems with this formulation. In the first instance 
it presupposes that undistorted acts of work continue to underlie the distortions 
of the capitalist labor process. This is reminiscent of Marx’s subject-centered 
account of labor as an inherently purposive activity. Thus rather than grounding 
critical theory in the struggles of workers collectively to ameliorate the 
consequences of capital, Honneth evokes a naturalistic account of labor that 
stands opposed to capital in its own right. In partial recognition of these 
problems, Honneth’s next attempt to reconcile the moral insights of Habermas 
with the material interests of Marx takes an intersubjective turn. 
 The starting point for Honneth’s later essay, “Moral Consciousness and 
Class Domination” (Honneth 1995a), is the proposition that “late capitalist state 
interventionism dries up the political and practical interests of wage workers by 
means of a policy of material compensations and the institutional integration of 
the wage policy of the labor unions” (ibid.: 216). This serves to undermine the 
importance of redistributive notions of justice for class struggle. Hence the need 
to switch from an account of injustice grounded in “the unequal distribution of 
material goods” to one grounded in “the asymmetrical distribution of cultural 
and psychological life chances” (ibid.: 217).2 In which case, it is not the 
maldistribution of material resources but the “maldistribution of opportunities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In many respects the autonomy of individuals is itself a function of private property relations, in which case the 
conflict is a conflict over two forms of property right. 
2 As Marx notes, “Capital … takes no account of the health and the length of life of the worker, unless society 
forces it to do so” (Marx 1976: 381). 
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for cultural education, social honor, and identity-guaranteeing work …” (ibid.: 
218) that forms the basis for workers’ struggles. 
 To this end, Honneth draws on Sennett and Cobb’s work (1972) to argue 
that workers suffer “hidden injuries that arise from the unequal distribution of 
social dignity” (Honneth 1995a: 218). These are felt, primarily, by lower, 
primarily manually employed occupational groups who are deemed to be most at 
risk from a loss of recognition, esteem, honor, dignity and respect. However, 
because this group of workers lack “the identity supporting recognition structure 
of a collective social movement … practical reactions to these daily experiences 
of injustice are limited to individual or group-specific constructions of a counter 
culture of compensatory respect …” (ibid.: 218). Consequently, lower-class 
workers lack the coherent linguistic expression required to articulate their injuries 
in a politically recognizable form. It then falls to social scientists (such as 
Honneth) to view labor struggles, which lie below the threshold of publicly 
recognized normative conflict, as indicators of a consciousness of injustice which 
implicitly lays claim to the right to the autonomous organization of work. Thus 
rather than attempting to ground critical theory in the struggles of the organized 
working class, Honneth grounds the origins of resistance in agents that lie 
“below the threshold of publicly recognized normative conflict” (ibid.: 219). 
 Honneth justifies this approach on the grounds that “the social protests of 
the lower classes are not motivationally guided by positively formulated moral 
principles, but by the violations of intuitive notions of justice” (Honneth 1995a: 
262). To this extent, they draw on a raw, unrefined, pre-theoretical resource that 
equates with the moral core of human identity. Nevertheless, Honneth’s 
emphasis on the struggles of the lower classes sits uneasily alongside his claim 
that moral concerns have supplanted material ones. For if it is the case that a 
higher standard of living deflects the class struggle from material towards 
immaterial goods, then this should primarily affect the struggles of higher-class 
workers whose material concerns have already been met. Why, then, privilege 
sections of the workforce for whom material concerns have greater priority? 
Thus, while Honneth’s emphasis on the moral motivations of struggles serves to 
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bring a normatively invigorated critical theory back into relationship with those 
who labor within the system, it also abstracts from the empirical concerns that 
motivate workers to struggle collectively against the system. To this extent, 
Honneth’s attempt to uncover a pre-theoretical basis for resistance — grounded 
in the moral identity of humanity — circumvents the struggles of the labor 
movement to confront the morally incapacitating imperatives of the system. 
 Unfortunately, as Honneth’s work on the moral foundations of workers’ 
struggles has developed, so has the concern to anchor the latter in an ontological 
conception of intersubjectivity. Thus rather than attempting to articulate the 
struggles of workers to attain greater autonomy, Honneth seeks to discover the 
moral grammar upon which their autonomy depends. To this end, Honneth sets 
out to locate within intersubjectivity the conditions for the possibility of an 
“undistorted relation to oneself” (Honneth 1995b: 1). Having thus deduced an 
undamaged form of identity formation Honneth criticizes those aspects of 
modernity that disturb, distort or otherwise deform healthy modes of ethical 
development. 
 
Struggles for recognition 
In Struggles for Recognition (1995b) Honneth sets about replacing Habermas’ claim 
that undistorted communication comprises the normative core of critical theory 
in favor of undistorted recognition. Whilst remaining true to Habermas’ attempt 
to ground Struggles for Moral Redemption critical theory in a universal conception of 
ethical life common to and independent of all particular social forms: 
In contrast to those movements that distance themselves from Kant, this concept of the 
good should not be conceived as the expression of substantive values that constitute the 
ethos of a concrete tradition-based community. Rather, it has to do with the structural 
elements of ethical life, which, from the general point of view of the communicative 
enabling of self-realization, can be normatively extracted from the plurality of all 
particular forms of life. (ibid.: 172) 
Thus, while seeking to broaden and deepen the normative ideals that underlie 
Habermas’ conception of communicative action, Honneth retains the latter’s 
	  	   110 
commitment to a general account of morality unencumbered by the substantive 
values of a particular community. To this end, Honneth, like Habermas, seeks to 
discover the core moral identity of humanity in Hegel’s early writings on 
intersubjectivity, although Honneth departs from Habermas’ emphasis on the 
distinction between labor and interaction in the belief that Hegel’s writings on 
recognition can embrace both. Honneth then follows Ludwig Siep in arguing that 
Hegel’s notion of struggles for recognition comprises a normative reworking of 
Hobbes’s notion of struggles for self-preservation. 
 What Honneth finds in Hegel is the notion that property struggles are not 
only injurious to an individual’s material well-being, but also to his/her moral 
dignity. This is demonstrated by the fact that the injured party is willing to engage 
in a life-and-death struggle with their adversary. Having demonstrated that 
human dignity is more important than mere survival, Hegel argues that the 
reconciliation of conflict requires not a Leviathan state with a monopoly of 
violence as Hobbes recommends, but a set of morally sanctioned property rights 
capable of determining the legitimacy of ownership claims (ibid.: 47).3 To this 
extent, argues Honneth, Hegel’s reinterpretation of Hobbes comprises an 
“epoch-making new version of the conception of social struggle, according to 
which practical conflict between subjects can be understood as an ethical 
moment in a movement occurring within a collective social life” (ibid.: 17). 
Nevertheless, Honneth is critical of Hegel’s attempt to ground ethical life in a 
metaphysical worldview. To correct this Honneth turns to the writings of the 
social psychologist George Herbert Mead to provide a naturalistic counterweight 
to the former’s speculative account of social recognition. 
 Honneth is drawn to Mead’s account because, like Hegel’s, it is based on a 
prior conception of mutual dependence in which individual identity arises from 
an intersubjective process of validation (Mead 1970). To this extent Hegel and 
Mead are agreed, in principle, that “the reproduction of social life is governed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although it is worth noting that Hobbes does not reduce all recognition claims to material ones. On the 
contrary, Hobbes argues that: “The public worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Commonwealth 
is that which men commonly call DIGNITY” (Hobbes 1968: 152). 
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the imperative of mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical 
relation-to-self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative 
perspective of one’s partner in interaction, as their social addressee.” (Honneth 
1995b: 92) 
 Nevertheless, Honneth expresses dissatisfaction with the empirical and 
historical aspects of Mead’s approach on the grounds that it lacks a post-
conventional conception of morality. Honneth then returns to Hegel in order to 
generate a universal account of recognition capable of transcending every 
particular historical context (ibid.: 110). 
 This, however, as Honneth acknowledges, is a risky maneuver that threatens 
to reintroduce the very metaphysical underpinnings he sought to expel from 
Hegel through the turn to Mead. Nevertheless, Honneth believes that this 
comprises the only way to arrive at a general account of the intersubjective 
conditions for the possibility of human autonomy (ibid.: 176). Honneth then 
seeks to renew Hegel’s attempt to produce a philosophy of history grounded in 
the contention that just as unredeemed relations of recognition generate social 
struggle, so social struggle serves to expand relationships of recognition. In Hegel 
this takes the form of a theory of moral development which progresses through 
three “stages of social conflict” (ibid.: 23). The first is situated in the concrete-
particular sphere of family life, the second in the abstract-universal sphere of law 
and the third in the concrete-universal sphere of moral solidarity. Each of these 
stages corresponds to a different form of recognition: 
[I]n the affective relationship of recognition found in the family, human individuals are 
recognized as concrete creatures of need; in the cognizant-formal relationship of 
recognition found in law, they are recognized as abstract legal persons; and finally, in the 
emotionally enlightened relationship of recognition found in the State, they are 
recognized as concrete universals, that is as subjects who are socialized in their 
particularity. (ibid.: 25) 
Honneth then sets about reconstructing Hegel’s theory of moral development in 
order to generate an historically evolving conception of intersubjectivity in 
general. However, by eschewing the very specific — and quintessentially modern 
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form of — ethical life which grounds this project in social reality, Honneth risks 
transforming historically specific forms of identity formation into a 
transhistorical blueprint for identity formation in general. 
 
Three steps to heaven? 
Step one: love 
In Hegel’s schema love represents the “first stage of reciprocal recognition, 
because in it subjects mutually confirm each other with regard to the concrete 
nature of their needs and thereby recognize each other as needy creatures” (ibid.: 
95). To this extent, love is restricted to the private sphere of friendships, 
partnerships and parent–child relationships and is not, according to Honneth, 
amenable to moral development. To give concrete content to this stage, Honneth 
turns to Donald Winnicott on the grounds that his object-relations approach is 
well suited to a phenomenology of recognition. In particular, Honneth 
emphasizes Winnicott’s suggestion that adult maturity is “dependent on the 
capacity, acquired in early childhood, to strike a balance between symbiosis and 
self-assertion” (ibid.: 98). According to Winnicott, at a certain stage in its 
development the child acts aggressively towards its mother in order to test 
whether she exists in her own right. “If the ‘mother’ managed to pass the child’s 
unconscious test by enduring the aggressive attacks without withdrawing her love 
in revenge, she now belongs, from the perspective of the child, to a painfully 
accepted external world” (ibid.: 104). Through this process each comes to 
recognize the other as not only dependent on them for love but also an 
independent being in their own right. Children who succeed in passing through 
this developmental stage go on to become normal, healthy, autonomous adults.4 
“This fundamental level of emotional confidence … which the intersubjective 
experience of love helps to bring about, constitutes the psychological 
precondition for the development of all further attitudes of self-respect” (ibid.: 
107). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 According to Honneth, “instrumentalism” only arises in “pathological” cases in which “egocentric 
independence” or “symbiotic dependence” turn into ‘disorders’ such as “masochism” and “sadism” (ibid.: 106). 
	  	   113 
 To this extent, Honneth takes Winnicott’s writings on child development to 
represent an ideal of interaction that comprises the transhistorical basis for 
normal family development in general. Thus despite criticizing Hegel for 
universalizing the patriarchal model of bourgeois family relations, Honneth 
sanctions Winnicott’s universalization of white, middle-class, patriarchal family 
life in 1950s America. Thus, in support of Winnicott, Honneth argues that 
confident adult roles are dependent on the child’s relationship with the mother. 
According to Honneth’s translator, the term mother designates “a role that can 
be fulfilled by persons other than the biological mother” (ibid.: xiii). So the term 
appears in scare quotes in the English translation, but not the German original. 
This gives the impression that the role of mother is one of the invariant basic 
structures of family life. Families that fail to conform to this norm can be 
charged with exhibiting pathology, disorder and deviation from the normal form 
of family life. 
 The problem here is not so much Honneth’s attempt to associate critical 
theory with an outdated view of family structures—although that is bad 
enough—but his attempt to confer on the latter a transhistorical status grounded 
in the moral grammar of intersubjectivity. Thus it is one thing to claim that one 
family form is morally superior to another; it is another to argue that this 
judgment rests on an objective evaluation of family forms, not least because this 
flies in the face of critical theory’s concern to expand the capacity of participants 
to determine their own moral principles — as in Habermas’ account of discourse 
ethics — rather than looking to an objective expert to prescribe what constitutes 
a normal form of family life irrespective of participant’s culture, concerns and 
values. 
 Taken in conjunction with his claim that the private sphere does not admit 
of the potential for normative development, Honneth appears to endorse the 
view that family relationships in 1950s America comprise the norm for growing 
healthy and happy humans. Anything that departs from this norm comprises a 
pathological deviation from the ideal form of identity formation. Indeed, if the 
family form is not amenable to moral development, it follows that feminist calls 
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to restructure family life are — as Winnicott himself argues — an abnormality 
(see Winnicott 1986: 188), thereby placing Honneth’s version of critical theory at 
odds with the struggles of the women’s movement to enhance social autonomy 
in line with the normative content of modernity. This also raises concerns about 
Honneth’s claim that the family comprises a private sphere in which recognition 
claims are restricted to love. While this may have been the prevailing norm in the 
1950s, since the advent of feminism and its politicization of the personal gender 
identities have acquired a more public guise. The norm of participative parity 
once foreign to the private sphere has subsequently become one of the key issues 
that men and women struggle with on a day-to-day basis. All of which casts 
doubt on Honneth’s claim that family relationships do not avail themselves of 
normative development.5 
 
Step two: rights 
According to Honneth, it is only with the stage of law or rights (Recht) that 
normative development occurs. This begins with the bourgeoisie’s struggle to 
free itself from the status-bound evaluations of feudalism. To this extent, argues 
Honneth, the bourgeoisie play a key role in generating a universalistic conception 
of legality that underlies the modern notion of autonomous individuality. 
Nevertheless, Honneth is reluctant to support Mead’s assertion that legal rights 
arise from a specific form of concrete-community. On the contrary, argues 
Honneth, such rights possess a post-conventional character in keeping with 
Hegel’s philosophy of history. “With the transition to modernity, the post-
conventional principles of justification that had already been developed in 
philosophy and political theory made their way into established law …” 
(Honneth 1995b: 109). In this way modernity brings into being a legal system 
that expresses the universal interests of all members of society whereby each 
agrees to recognize all others as persons capable of autonomously making 
reasonable decisions about moral norms. However, while the recognition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Although Honneth does concede that freedom is enhanced the “more rights come to be shared by partners” 
(ibid.: 107). 
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individuals as ends in themselves knows no further development, the conditions 
under which individuals are free to exercise their autonomy are capable of 
expansion. Consequently, the more individuals are enabled by social 
circumstances to act in an autonomous manner, the more relations of recognition 
are expanded throughout society. 
 Thus having generated a post-conventional form of civil rights, the 
bourgeoisie find themselves under pressure from below by disadvantaged groups 
seeking to expand citizenship rights beyond the legal sphere. To theorize this 
process Honneth turns to the writings of T. H. Marshall in support of his claim 
that workers can avail themselves of bourgeois liberties only when “the 
appropriate preconditions [are] present for equal participation in a rational 
agreement” (Honneth 1995b: 115). The importance of Marshall’s work, for 
Honneth, lies in its developmental conception of citizenship rights. This takes a 
three-stage form. In the first stage civil rights guarantee an individual’s liberty; in 
the second political rights guarantee participation in the formation of laws; and in 
the third social rights guarantee basic welfare needs. Thus it is only insofar as 
disadvantaged groups avail themselves of the most political rights that they can 
take advantage of civil right and it is only insofar as they acquire welfare rights 
that they can take advantage of political rights. 
 To this extent, argues Honneth, to be involved as morally responsible 
persons, individuals need not only legal protection from interference in their 
sphere of liberty, but also the legally assured opportunity for participation in the 
public process of will-formation, an opportunity they can only actually take 
advantage of, however, if they also have a certain social standard of living. 
Nevertheless, rather than analyzing the third and final stage of social solidarity as 
an attempt by workers to extend the normative content of modernity into the 
economic system, Honneth views it as a means to acquire the material conditions 
necessary for the achievement of individual autonomy. As a consequence, his 
account of social solidarity is insufficiently informed by workers’ struggles to re-
moralize the economy. 
 
	  	   116 
Step three: solidarity 
According to Honneth, the sphere of solidarity arises from the need to evaluate 
individuals on the basis of their specific contribution to the life of the 
community. However, he rejects Mead’s assertion that it is possible to relate the 
determination of social worth to the division of labor. “The solution that Mead 
envisions here involves linking self-realization to engaging in socially useful work. 
The degree of recognition accorded to persons who, within the context of the 
societal division of labor, fulfill their functions “well” is enough to help them 
develop a consciousness of their individual particularity” (ibid.: 88). On the 
contrary, argues Honneth, “the evaluation of the various functional jobs 
depends, for its part, on the overarching goals of the community” (ibid.: 90). In 
Habermasian terms this is equivalent to arguing that the social validity accorded 
different occupations arises not from the economic system but from the 
symbolic lifeworld. Hence, Honneth’s attempt to link social recognition to the 
abstract goals of society through a value-community in which prestige or 
standing signifies only the degree of social recognition the individual earns for his 
or her form of self-realization by thus contributing, to a certain extent, to the 
practical realization of society’s abstractly defined goals. 
 Nevertheless, Honneth’s rejection of Mead’s approach leaves the nature of 
the relationship between the cultural sphere and the economic sphere under-
theorized. Thus it is unclear whether the value-community complements the 
economic system as in Parsonian functionalism or conflicts with it as in 
Marshall’s writings on the welfare state. This points to an important lacuna in 
Honneth’s account of social recognition. Although Honneth is concerned to 
identify a greater social role for recognition in motivating social struggle, this is 
largely confined to the non-economic sphere. For this reason, Honneth defines 
value predominantly in cultural terms, whether in the form of “cultural self-
understandings” which function to “realize culturally defined goals” (ibid.: 122), 
or in the form of “cultural conflict” between groups that deploy “symbolic 
force” to control “the climate of public attention” (ibid.: 127). The economic 
system that forms the backdrop to Habermas’ writings on the lifeworld is in 
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danger of disappearing into the background in Honneth’s analysis. When it does 
appear it takes the form of strategic subjects who pursue their material interests 
in a utilitarian fashion devoid of moral meaning beyond questions of 
redistribution. This, however, lapses behind Hegel’s attempt to ground material 
struggle in a more substantive conception of ethical life. 
 
Money, markets and morality 
The impetus for Honneth’s recognition-theoretic account of sociality arises from 
the desire to uncover the role played by moral claims in motivating class struggle. 
These moral insights are opposed to the Marxist category of material interests. 
“The motives for rebellion, protest, and resistance have generally been 
transformed into categories of “interest” and these interests are supposed to 
emerge from the objective inequalities in the distribution of material 
opportunities without ever being linked, in any way, to the everyday web of 
moral feelings” (Honneth 1995b: 161). Against this Honneth seeks to reconnect 
the motives for social struggle to the moral grammar of human life. “Unlike all 
utilitarian models of explanation, it suggests the view that motives or social 
resistance and rebellion are formed in the context of moral experiences stemming 
from the violation of deeply rooted expectations regarding recognition” (ibid.: 
163). This, as Foster notes, leads Honneth to adopt Habermas’ distinction 
between “the sphere of normative interaction and the sphere of production” 
(Foster 1999: 7). Thus, according to Honneth: “In the first case, we are dealing 
with the analysis of competition for scarce goods, whereas in the second case we 
are dealing with the analysis of struggle over the intersubjective conditions for 
personal integrity” (ibid.: 165). However, by focusing on the cultural sources of 
social conflict, Honneth perpetuates the divide between materiality and morality 
that detaches labor from the normative content of modernity. 
 Although Honneth acknowledges that a recognition-theoretic model has a 
duty not only to extend but possibly to correct an interest-based model of social 
conflict insofar as “relations of social esteem are indirectly coupled with patterns 
of income distribution” (Honneth 1995b: 166), he falls short of Nancy Fraser’s 
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claim that “recognition is the fundamental concept of justice and can encompass 
distribution” (Fraser 1997: 74).6 By restricting struggles for recognition to the 
intersubjective conditions for personal integrity, Honneth bypasses the role 
played by the economy in reifying questions of social recognition. Thus, 
according to Foster, “what is lacking from [Honneth’s] work thus far is an 
account of the relation between the denial of recognition and structurally 
reproduced forms of material exclusion” (Foster 1999: 13). Above all, Honneth 
fails to acknowledge the way the economy transforms status-based forms of 
social worth into pecuniary forms of market value. However, this calls for a more 
substantive conception of ethical life capable of placing a normative floor under 
the economy. 
 The notion that money comprises a means to allocate social worth is not 
alien to Honneth’s writings. Unfortunately, it remains little more than an aside in 
an otherwise culturally determined account of social recognition. To this extent, 
Honneth’s account of recognition requires augmenting in terms of the 
relationship between property and prestige. Thus, according to Veblen, under 
modern conditions: “The possession of wealth … becomes in popular 
apprehension, itself a meritorious act. Wealth is now itself intrinsically honorable 
and confers honor upon its possessor” (Veblen 1992: 37).7 In this way, 
inequalities in the distribution of material wealth are linked to the web of moral 
feelings prevailing in society through the role money plays in allocating social 
esteem under capitalism. Money does not displace morality so much as 
appropriate its role in disseminating social validation. Thus, the question of 
property ownership is not separate from the question of social esteem, as the 
former now comprises the basis for the latter. As Veblen notes, once “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Indeed, Honneth specifically argues that “not all forms of resistance have their roots in injuries to moral claims” 
as there are many instances in which “the securing of economic survival … motivated massive protest and revolt” 
(Honneth 1995b: 166). 
7 It is interesting to note that while Hobbes argues that the value of a person is commensurate with the price their 
capacities command in the market, he also recognizes an intersubjective element to evaluation. “The Value or 
WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his 
Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another” (Hobbes 
1968: 151–2). 
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possession of property becomes the basis of popular esteem … it becomes a 
requisite to that complacency which we call self-respect” (ibid.: 38).8 
 Moreover, just as social esteem is a source of material power in pre-modern 
times, so money is a source of material power in modern times. The difference is 
that now the modern medium of social recognition is capable of purchasing 
goods and services directly as a social power in its own right. Indeed, it is this 
that comprises the material power of money. However, this should not distract 
from its moral content. On the contrary, the fact that the medium of social 
validation is also the means to acquire goods and services demonstrates the 
degree to which questions of distribution are predicated on questions of social 
worth. To this extent, money — in the absence of an alternative value-
community — is the key means for determining human worth in a modern 
capitalist system. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the value-
community, which oversees this state of affairs, should reflect its utilitarian 
calculus. 
 Thus against Talcott Parson’s suggestion that modern sociality generates an 
anti-Hobbesian value-system which integrates strategic actors within a common 
set of moral beliefs (Parsons 1968), Robert Merton argues that the key value 
promoted by modern capitalism is pecuniary success. In other words, rather than 
arguing that the value-system of modern societies is an antidote to the selfishness 
engendered by market capitalism, Merton argues that the former is a vehicle for 
the promotion of the latter. To this extent, the ruthless pursuit of pecuniary 
goals, coupled with the connotation between high income and high social status, 
comprises the hegemonic value-community of modern capitalism. Thus, it is not 
simply a question of opposing morality to the amorality of interest-based actions, 
but of opposing a collective morality based on cooperation, community and 
social justice to an individualistic ethos based on self-interest, success and 
technical efficiency. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Trade unionists often point out that in so far as money is a measure of social esteem under capitalism, it not 
only contributes to the material well-being of workers but also their sense of social worth. 
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 If Merton is correct, then a recognition-theoretic-based form of critical 
theory cannot afford to ignore the role played by the economy in allocating social 
esteem. Thus rather than viewing social recognition in primarily cultural terms, 
we need to enquire what it is about the economic system that allows it to usurp 
the role of allocating social recognition. Unfortunately, Honneth fails to ask this 
— partly because he views the system as an expression of material interests and 
partly because he has adopted an increasingly individualistic conception of 
autonomy (Kalyvas 1999: 100). As a consequence, Honneth neglects the role 
workers’ struggles play in generating alternative value-communities that resist 
market-based forms of value-allocation in favor of welfare criteria. Thus rather 
than simply adopting the contrast between the language of interests and the 
language of morality, critical theory needs to examine the extent to which their 
diremption comprises two sides of an ethical totality which workers’ struggle 
plays a key role in reconciling. It is thus possible to argue that the pursuit of 
utilitarian interests only appears to lack a moral content because such interests 
operate in a social environment in which ethical life has been monetarized. 
 As we have seen, Hegel was the first theorist to analyze this phenomenon in 
any detail. Unfortunately, Marx’s identification of labor with self-objectifying 
subjectivity deprived critical theory of these normative resources. Hence the 
importance of Simmel’s account of the way the economic system serves to 
transform moral duties into monetary obligations. According to Simmel, with the 
advent of modern markets “the honorary prize, which reflects the cooperation of 
the whole group, has to be replaced by the money prize, which reflects the 
ultimate recognition of the performance. The enlargement of the social group 
requires the transition to expressing merit in money terms because it means the 
inescapable atomization of such a group” (Simmel 1978: 348). To this extent, 
there exists a dialectical relationship between the monetarization of social 
recognition and the atomization of individual decision-making. Thus the more 
questions of social recognition acquire an economic form, the more individuals 
are freed from anterior moral obligations. However, while this creates a 
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tremendous boost for individual autonomy it also serves to disguise the extent to 
which social agents are dependent on one another. 
Whereas in the period prior to the emergence of a money economy, the individual was 
directly dependent upon his group and the exchange of services united everyone closely 
with the whole of society, today everyone carries around with him, in a condensed latent 
form, his claim to the achievements of others. Everyone has the choice of deciding when 
and where he wants to assert this claim, and therefore loosen the direct relations of the 
earlier form of exchange. The extreme significant power of money to lend to the 
individual a new independence from group interests is manifested not only in the basic 
differences between a money and a barter economy but also within the money economy 
itself. (ibid.: 342) 
In this way the monetarization of social recognition fosters autonomy by freeing 
individuals from the status-based value-communities to which they formerly 
owed their moral allegiance. Thus while Honneth is quite correct to emphasize 
the relationship between universalistic forms of social recognition and the 
development of individual autonomy, he fails to account for this in terms of the 
emergence of a monetarized system of social recognition in which the pursuit of 
economic interests becomes detached from anterior moral obligations. 
 However, insofar as the economy performs moral tasks in an amoral 
fashion any attempt to enlarge the field of normative decision-making must 
revoke the system’s reification of intersubjectivity. Hence the importance of 
Marshall’s account of the role played by workers’ struggles in extending the 
normative content of modernity into the material sphere. Thus rather than 
confining moral struggles to the cultural sphere, Marshall shows how workers 
help to democratize the economy’s capacity to shape the social identities of 
citizens, not only between the distribution of wealth and individual autonomy but 
also between the distribution of wealth and collective autonomy. Unfortunately, 
Honneth fails to acknowledge the extent to which modern forms of social 
solidarity result from the struggles of participants to establish control over the 
autopoietic impulses of the system. Consequently, his notion of social solidarity 
assumes a functional rather than a critical orientation to the system’s capacity to 
commodify labor. However, before developing these insights further in the next 
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chapter I want to re-examine Honneth’s appropriation of Hegel’s notion of 
undamaged intersubjectivity in relation to labor. 
 
Beyond Hegel? 
According to Honneth, in Hegel’s latter writings, “the programme of the 
philosophy of consciousness gained the upper hand … over all intersubjectivist 
insights …” (Honneth 1995b: 62). This is a controversial claim that writers such 
as Robert Williams (1992) dispute. Nevertheless, even if we were to concede the 
point, it still needs explaining. The only clue that Honneth offers concerns 
Hegel’s move from a theory of communicative action to one grounded in “the 
theoretical and practical confrontation of individuals with their environment” 
(Honneth 1995b: 29). This suggests that the transition from an intersubjective to 
a subject-centered account of modernity arises from Hegel’s attempt to 
incorporate an instrumental relationship to nature into his model of ethical 
solidarity. To this extent, Honneth appears sympathetic to Benhabib’s claim that 
the subject-centered character of both Hegel and Marx’s writings arises from 
their attempt to model human activity on labor. “[B]ecause the primary model of 
human activity to which both resort is, in the final analysis, work and not 
interaction, the discourse of trans-subjectivity comes to dominate” (Benhabib 
1986: 68). In other words, given labor’s inherent tendency to self-objectification, 
a labor-based model of humanity inevitably results in a trans-subjective account 
of sociality.9 
 However, if we start from the view that labor is a social process — even 
under capitalism where it appears to be pared down to its instrumental essence 
— then rather than regarding labor under capitalism as the paradigmatic form of 
humanity’s metabolism with nature, labor’s instrumental character is to be 
regarded as arising from its capitalist organization. In which case, Hegel’s 
tendency to subordinate an intersubjective to a subject-centered account of 
modernity can be explained, not in terms of his adoption of a labor model of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 One is reminded again of Hannah Arendt’s (1958) contention that there is something inherently reifying about 
labour that renders it intersubjectively unassimilable. 
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sociality, but in terms of his attempt to do justice to the autopoietic imperatives 
of the economy. As Honneth notes, for Hegel, “individuals’ market-mediated 
activities and interests — which later come to be gathered under the title “civil 
society” — comprise a “negative” though still constitutive “zone” of the 
“ethical” [Sittlich] whole” (Honneth 1995b: 13). To this extent, civil society 
comprises an alienated (externalized) form of ethical life in which moral 
prescriptions take the objective form of economic laws.10 
Money is that materially existing concept, unitary form, or the possibility of all objects of 
need. By elevating need and work to this level of universality [Allgemeinheit] a monstrous 
[ungeheures] system of common interest and mutual dependence is formed among a great 
people, a self-propelling life of the dead [ein sich in sich bewegendes Leben des Toten], which 
moves hither and thither, blind and elemental and like a wild animal, it stands in constant 
need of being tamed and kept under control. (Hegel 1979: 249)11 
Nevertheless, Hegel has no wish to return to feudal forms of economic 
arrangements. On the contrary, he sees the way to salvation through a form of 
ethical life capable of re-internalizing the market’s “invisible hand” mechanism. 
However, because Hegel, like Marx, Habermas and Honneth after him, regards 
the system’s externalization of morality as a natural consequence of modernity, 
only an objective form of morality can tame the self-propelling imperatives of the 
system. Thus Benhabib’s trans-subjective form of sociality is less a function of 
labor than the economic system that sets it to work. 
 Consequently, rather than arriving at a form of ethical life commensurate 
with modernity’s subjectification of substance, Hegel sacrifices individual 
autonomy to the autonomy of a self-objectifying subject writ large. Substance is 
then reconciled with subject in the form of an absolute subject modeled on the 
autopoietic system it is designed to tame. In which case, as Benhabib argues, 
Hegel’s “model of crises integration and management does not alleviate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 According to Lukács, the German terms Entäusserung and Entfremdung are simply translations of the English 
word “alienation” which was used “in works of economic theory to betoken the sale of a commodity, and in 
works on natural law to refer to the loss of an aboriginal freedom, the handing over or alienation of freedom to 
the society which came into being as a result of a social contract” (1971: 538). 
11 The reference is to Hegel’s First Philosophy of Spirit (1979), but the translation is a slightly modified version of the 
one that appears in Lukács’ Young Hegel (1971: 333). 
	  	   124 
consequences for citizens of their loss of freedom, but encourages the emergence 
of a second sphere of social relations, which are as omnipresent vis-à-vis the 
citizens as the laws of the market are vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie. This second sphere 
is the bureaucratic system of justice and administration” (Benhabib 1986: 100). If 
we are concerned to arrive at an intersubjective notion of morality, which avoids 
the system’s reification of morality, it is necessary to link the former to the 
struggles of agents to re-moralize the system. 
 If it has failed in this it is because critical theory entertains a naturalistic 
account of labor that views the objectivity of the system as an inevitable 
consequence of the purposive transformation of nature. Once it is assumed that 
the objective character of sociality is inescapable it must then be analyzed in an 
objective fashion. In Marx’s case, this takes the form of scientific socialism, in 
Habermas’ case a post-conventional notion of morality, and in Honneth’s case a 
trans-subjective account of ethical life that grounds the moral grammar of social 
conflicts in a teleological account of historical development. Thus, rather than 
inquiring into the normative principles employed by modern agents to justify 
their struggles, Honneth seeks to deduce the transcendental conditions for the 
possibility of a successful life from the internal structure of intersubjectivity. As a 
result, Honneth follows Marx and Habermas in assuming an objective standpoint 
over and above the intersubjective standpoint of participants in the lifeworld. 
This enables each to ground his critique of modernity in a moral ideal 
commensurate with the essence of humanity. Armed with an objective account 
of ethical life Honneth then translates the normative concerns of critical theory 
into a scientific account of modernity’s pathologies. 
 
Pathology and social critique 
Honneth is explicit about his desire to abstract from the moral ends of 
participants in order to arrive at the moral ends inherent within intersubjectivity 
per se. “This framework lets an objective-intentional context emerge, in which 
historical processes no longer appear as mere events but rather as stages in a 
conflictual process of formation, leading to a gradual expansion of relationships 
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of recognition” (Honneth 1995b: 170). Nevertheless, this not only transforms 
social agents into unwitting means for a set of transhistorical objectives, it also 
transforms critical theory into a positivistic account of modernity in which the 
ethical formulations of participants are buried beneath the objective assessments 
of experts. This is confirmed in an interview with Simon Critchley in which 
Honneth argues that “the only chance we have to keep the tradition of Critical 
Theory alive is to continue … the social-philosophical enterprise of a kind of 
diagnosis of our present culture, the pathologies of that culture, of a certain 
capitalist culture” (Honneth 1998: 37). Questioned about the suitability of the 
language of ‘pathology’ for critical theory, Honneth replies: “I guess I think you 
can’t do it [critical theory] without the language of pathologies … the Critical 
Theory of society presupposes some vision of a society that would exclude the 
sorts of damage they describe. So this kind of normative underpinning of an 
enterprise like the critique of social pathologies is always there” (ibid.). In 
conclusion, Honneth argues, “we [critical theorists] are the specialists for the 
deficiencies of society … we are, in a sense, the doctors of society” (ibid.: 39). 
 However, in departing from his attempt to ground ethical life in the moral 
autonomy of human beings in favor of the conditions for their realization in 
general, Honneth risks sacrificing a human in favor of a supra-human conception 
of self-constitution. The struggles of participants to articulate modernity’s moral 
ends are in danger of being reduced to mere means for an unfolding supra-
historical telos. To this extent, Honneth fails to complete the intersubjective 
reformulation of critical social theory begun by Habermas. As a consequence, 
critical theory finds itself in conflict with, rather than articulating, the moral ends 
of participants. In his doctoral role Honneth seeks objectively to determine what 
comprises a healthy form of sociality. Thus rather than arguing that a healthy 
form of sociality is one in which agents are in a position to intersubjectively 
determine their own sense of well-being, Honneth endorses an expert culture in 
which welfare regimes are imposed on participants from without. 
 By assuming the standpoint of a doctor Honneth removes himself from the 
need to engage in a dialogue of equals with the agents he is concerned to liberate. 
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Armed with a notion of what comprises their rational interests there is no need 
to enquire what comprises the rational interests of agents. This perhaps explains 
why Honneth is reluctant to ground his account of workers’ struggles in the 
organized labor movement, preferring instead to voice the inarticulate concerns 
of the lower social classes, who are incapable of diagnosing their own ills and 
suggesting their own remedies. Having discovered a set of moral principles that 
makes autonomous agency possible, there is no need to subject them to the 
validation of autonomous agents. On the contrary, because the struggles of social 
agents are not the starting point for his version of critical theory, Honneth can 
ignore what James Bohman calls the “knowledgeable social agents to whom its 
claims are publicly addressed” (Bohman 1996). 
 Ultimately, Honneth’s failure to identify with the struggles of participants to 
render the system accountable is symptomatic of critical theory’s failure to 
challenge the system’s colonization of the lifeworld. Thus Honneth believes that 
it is possible to keep social philosophy (his term for critical theory) alive only in 
terms of a formalistic anthropology grounded in the fundamental conditions of 
human life in general (Honneth 1996: 394). However, by adopting a medical 
model of social diagnosis Honneth only compounds the weakness of critical 
theory by aligning it with the capacity of the system to reify intersubjectivity. 
Thus rather than endorsing an intersubjective version of critical theory in which 
“members of a concrete society decide what counts as “pathological” in their 
own social life-form …” (ibid.: 393), Honneth borrows from the system’s 
capacity to reify the lifeworld in order to generate an objective account of social 
normality. 
 However, if we wish to reconcile critical theory with the normative content 
of modernity it is necessary to do justice to the ethos of autonomy that informs 
it. This means repudiating attempts to provide critical theory with an 
anthropological underpinning in favor of the struggles of participants to resist 
the reifying tendencies of the system. The substantive content of critical theory is 
supplied not by the invariant structures of humanity, but by the capacity of social 
movements to humanize the system, on the understanding that the ethos of 
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humanism develops in opposition to the systems transformation of participants 
into mere means for its autopoietic ends. 
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